European Diplomacy and the Balkan Problem

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EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND THE BALKAN PROBLEM

FOR a clear understanding of the recent events in the Balkan peninsula, it is necessary to go back to the Revolution of July 24, 1908. If we consider the condition of affairs in Turkey on the eve of that event, the attitude of the Balkan states to Turkey and to one another, and that of the great powers to Turkey, to the Balkan states and to one another, we shall be in a better position to trace the course of events during the past four years and to understand the situation that confronts European diplomacy to-day.

In July, 1906, the Hamidian régime of absolutism and terrorism was tottering to its fall. The rule of the palace favorites had bankrupted the country. The Turks, as well as the subject peoples in the provinces, were groaning under the exactions of the tax-farmers. No one in Turkey, however, dared protest, because of the system of espionage which extended everywhere. The army was unpaid and much of it in rags, and there were rebellions in Arabia and Albania. But it was Macedonia which was to cause Abdul Hamid's undoing—as well as that of the Young Turks four years later.

Article xxiii of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 provided for the convocation of an international commission to draw up a scheme of reform for the European provinces left to Turkey. This commission presented to the Porte the results of its labors, August 23, 1880; but this “Law for the Vilayets of Turkey in Europe” remained a dead letter, because the Porte refused to ratify it and the powers were too jealous of one another to unite in compulsion. In the meantime the Macedonians had constantly before their eyes object lessons in the results of freedom, as seen in the dominions of their Montenegrin, Servian and Bulgarian brethren, made independent or autonomous by the same treaty which left them in subjection. But every demand made either by the Macedonians themselves or by the powers in their behalf resulted only in increased repression and exaction. Their brethren in the free states, therefore, sent revolu-
tionary bands into Macedonia, partly for vengeance upon the Turks, partly to compel European intervention, from which each state hoped to profit territorially, as some of them had in 1878. Unfortunately, Macedonia resembles an anthropological museum with the specimens in chaotic arrangement. While every village is of one nationality, every district contains villages one of which may be Bulgarian, the next Servian, the next Greek and another Ottoman. It was the business of each of the bands to "convert" as many villages to its own nationality as possible; and the resulting animosity of Greeks, Servians and Bulgarians towards one another was even greater than their hatred of the common enemy, the Turk.

By 1903, Macedonia was in such a state of anarchy that the two powers having the greatest interests in the Balkans, Austria and Russia, with the concurrence of the other great powers, presented to the Porte a program of reform drawn up by their representatives at Mürzsteg, Austria, October 9, 1903. By the terms of the Mürzsteg program two civil agents, one appointed by Russia and one by Austria, were to supervise the local authorities in the application of reforms. The gendarmerie was to be reorganized under a foreign general in the Turkish service, who was to have associated with him a number of officers from the armies of the great powers. In 1905 a financial commission, consisting of representatives of France, Germany, Russia and Italy, was added to assist the civil agents of Austria and Russia and to introduce financial reforms. But practically nothing was accomplished of benefit to the Macedonians. The Turkish local officials offered a sullen but determined opposition to the introduction of the reforms; and as the civil agents had no executive power, they were helpless, beyond reporting to their respective governments the numerous massacres and outrages that took place. Abdul Hamid resorted to his old game of playing off one great power against another. Austria was bought off in 1907 by a concession to build a railroad through the sanjak of Novi Bazar, which would connect her Bosnian railroad with the Salonika-Monastir road and give her direct access to Salonika. This ended the Austro-Russian entente. The outrages in Macedonia, however,
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... grew worse; and when, in June, 1908, Edward VII visited the Russian emperor at Reval, a new program of reform was drawn up, which was not only to provide for more effective European supervision but also to control the administration of justice. Before the Reval program could be enforced, however, the Revolution transformed the Ottoman empire into a constitutional state.

What was the attitude of the several Balkan states towards Turkey and towards one another on the eve of the Turkish Revolution?

Servia had passed through five years of turmoil, which had almost brought her to the brink of ruin. After the assassination in 1903 of King Alexander and Queen Draga, who were under Austrian influence, Servia leaned once more upon Russia. But Servia is economically at the mercy of Austria, since by means of tariffs and regulations regarding imported live stock that power may ruin Servia at any time. Moreover, the concession secured by Austria from the Porte in 1907 for a railroad through Novi Bazar caused intense indignation in Servia. It has been the aim of the Serbs of Servia, ever since the Treaty of Berlin, to annex that district in order to secure a common boundary with their brethren in Montenegro; and they saw in this railroad concession a new obstacle to the fulfilment of their hopes. The relations between Servia and Bulgaria had been much improved by the negotiation in 1906 of a commercial convention, which lessened the dependence of Servia upon Austria by facilitating the export of Servian produce through Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea.

Under the benevolent despotism of Prince Nicholas, Montenegro had been making rapid strides in orderly progress for a decade previous to the Revolution. Its constant friendship for Russia was heightened by the irritation produced by the Austrian railroad concession in 1907 and by the evidence of Austrian political intrigue in Albania.

No state in the Balkan peninsula had made such remarkable progress in every direction as Bulgaria. Unlike Servia and Greece, she was almost independent of foreign powers financially. Her statesmen had consolidated her resources, and the
great improvements introduced in the army, in the building of 
roads and in education had been carried through, for the most 
part, without resort to foreign loans. Her statesmen pursued 
a foreign policy more independent than that of the other Balkan 
states, so that, although her relations with Russia were cordial, 
she was not unfriendly to Austria. The Porte indeed looked 
upon Bulgaria as the head and front of its troubles in Macedonia, 
and had the Revolution not occurred, in all probability war would 
have broken out in 1908; and the relations between Greece and 
Bulgaria were disturbed by the operations of their respective 
bands in Macedonia. With the other Balkan states, however, 
Bulgaria kept on friendly terms.

Greece, like Servia, had passed through a period of political 
disturbance which had reduced her almost to ruin. It was 
apparently impossible to overcome the factionalism that domi-
nated the country, and ministries succeeded each other in rapid 
succession without in any way improving the condition of things. 
Greek finances were embarrassed; and Greek foreign relations 
were in a most unsatisfactory condition. Because of the at-
tempts of the Panhellenists to "convert" the Rumanian Vlachs 
in her northern districts, anti-Greek demonstrations had been so 
pronounced in Rumania in 1905 that diplomatic intercourse was 
broken off. It was with difficulty that a semblance of friendly 
intercourse was maintained with Bulgaria, which was angered at 
the open manner in which the Turks favored the Greeks as 
against the Bulgarians in Macedonia. Moreover, the govern-
ment was under constant pressure from the powers to maintain 
the status quo in Crete.

The attitude of the great powers towards Turkey up to the 
Revolution of 1908 was characterized by the timidity and du-
plexity which one might expect to find among the heirs of a sick

\[\text{The following statistical information regarding the Balkan States may be helpful.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Debt (£)</th>
<th>Revenue (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4,329,108</td>
<td>24,407,976</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>2,631,152</td>
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<td>5,693,161</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servia</td>
<td>2,911,700</td>
<td>26,937,320</td>
<td>4,805,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>35,414,300</td>
<td>118,056,600</td>
<td>25,751,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The following statistical information regarding the Balkan States may be helpful. The population of Greece is that of 1907; the other data are for the year 1911.
but wicked relative. All are irritated by his bad deeds; but each is afraid to act for fear of losing his favor, and they are too suspicious of the intentions of one another to act collectively.

Russia, the ancient enemy of the Porte and the big brother of the southern Slavs, was not feared at Constantinople. Reduced to military impotence by the war with Japan, bankrupt and rent by revolution, it was well known that the most strenuous efforts of her statesmen would be needed for some years to secure domestic peace and prosperity. Not only was she not feared by her great neighbors, but her prestige was at its lowest in the Balkans, because of her necessarily nerveless policy there, in contrast to Austro-German determination to dominate the peninsula.

Great Britain, Turkey's sometime ally, was practically without influence at Constantinople; in fact she was there the most disliked of all the powers. She had tried, after the Armenian massacre of 1896, to unite the powers to compel Turkey to introduce reforms; she was constantly reminding the Porte of its unfulfilled pledges concerning Macedonia; she was the moving spirit among the powers in prohibiting the Porte's carrying out its will in Crete; and at that moment (June, 1908) her king was discussing with the tsar at Reval an increase of interference in Macedonia. Yet hers was after all a policy of pin pricks. Her millions of Moslem subjects in India and Egypt and her vast commercial interests made her fear to act single-handed.

France, too, was powerless. She was in the throes of her Moroccan difficulty, which bade fair to bring her to blows with Germany, and she could not afford to offend her Mohammedan subjects in northern Africa by rigorous action against the caliph of the Moslem world. Moreover France has millions invested in the Balkan peninsula, and her foreign policy is, to a great extent, dominated by her desire to protect the savings of her peasants invested abroad. She wants peace at almost any price; and, while desirous of seeing conditions improved in Macedonia, she was unwilling to participate in violent measures which might disturb the status quo in the Balkans and bring on a European war.

Italy was in an anomalous position. Her sympathies were
with the Triple Entente, Great Britain, France and Russia, in their desire to compel reforms in Macedonia. Her king had married the daughter of the prince of Montenegro. At this time, moreover, Italy was engaged in an educational propaganda in Albania, by means of which she hoped to strengthen her influence there. It is a cardinal principle of her foreign policy that no other great power shall be permitted to control the opposite coast of the Adriatic. Yet in these ambitions she comes in direct conflict with the aims of her ally, Austria-Hungary.

There remain the two great Teutonic powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary. With definite aims in their relations to the Ottoman empire, they have never permitted their interests there to be jeopardized by undue expression of sympathy for the subject races. Every attempt on the part of the pacifist powers to compel the Porte to improve conditions in its dominions was balked by the refusal of these military powers to unite in any representation to the Porte which would impair the sovereignty of the sultan. They did not participate in the occupation of Crete by the other great powers. In general, the Porte might confidently lean upon their support when in difficulty. The most adroit diplomatist and the man of greatest influence with the Porte among the diplomatic corps at Constantinople was its doyen, Marschall von Bieberstein. The visit of the German emperor to Constantinople and his action in the Moroccan affair increased German prestige immensely. William II was often referred to among the Turks as the friend of the sultan and the protector of the Moslems.

For this Austro-German friendship, however, payment was exacted. Ever since Sedan had destroyed Austria's hope of again wielding an influence in German affairs, the dual monarchy had turned its eyes to the southeast, determined to secure compensation there and especially to gain an outlet on the Aegean for its commerce. In this policy it was heartily supported by Germany. The first fruits of their coöperation were secured in the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Treaty of Berlin. At the Congress of Berlin, moreover, Austrian influence not only secured the retention of the sanjak
of Novi Bazar by Turkey, thereby separating the two Serb states whose territories had been made contiguous by the Treaty of San Stefano, but also established the right of joint occupation of the sanjak by Turkey and Austria-Hungary. These measures effectively prevented the growth of a great Serb empire to the south, whose existence would have destroyed for Austria-Hungary all hope of access to the Aegean. Servia's economic development was placed at the mercy of Austria-Hungary, and Austrian commercial interests became dominant in the Balkan peninsula. The securing of the railroad concession through Novi Bazar to connect the Bosnian railroad with the Turkish at Mitrovitza was the final blow to Serb hopes.

For Germany's friendship, payment has been taken in Asia Minor. By successive railway concessions Germany now has absolute control of the Anatolian Railway and the Bagdad Railway, which, when completed, will run through the Euphrates Valley and connect the Bosphorus with the Persian Gulf. The financial terms granted to the Bagdad Railway Company by the Turkish government were favorable to the concessionaires and onerous to Turkey. Not only were lands adjoining the railway granted to the company, but liberal portions of the tithes of the districts through which the railway was to pass were to be set aside to guarantee the gross receipts. The Bagdad Railway concession, granted in 1903, probably did more than any other single act of diplomacy to produce the present state of irritation between Great Britain and Germany, for it brought German influence to the shores of the Persian Gulf, which had hitherto been considered to lie wholly within the sphere of British influence. German diplomacy aimed to make German influence as dominant in Asia Minor as Austrian influence had become in European Turkey. Moreover, huge sums of money bearing high rates of interest had been lent to the Porte by the Deutsche Bank and other groups of German capitalists. As an evidence of the Porte's high regard for Germany, in June, 1908, it transferred the protection of Ottoman subjects in China from France to Germany.
Such were the reciprocal relations of the various states, great and small, interested in Balkan affairs, when the Revolution of July 24, 1908, came as a bolt from the blue. Not a statesman in Europe had believed that the dreamers of Paris and Geneva who formed the Young Turk Party could ever realize their hope of a regenerated and constitutional Turkey. The Committee of Union and Progress acted just when it did because of its belief that an autonomous Macedonia would necessarily result from the execution of the Reval program. Moreover, Greece was threatening to annex Crete, and war between Turkey and Bulgaria seemed certain, with all the chances in favor of Bulgaria. One of the fundamental principles of the Young Turks' policy was the maintenance and the exercise of governmental authority without foreign interference. The psychological moment for action had come. Abdul Hamid was compelled to issue an iradé reviving Midhat Pasha's constitution of 1876, and the Hamidian régime of terrorism ceased to be.

The Revolution produced a complete change in the diplomatic situation at Constantinople. The roles of Great Britain and of Germany were for the time reversed. Great Britain, after a decade of ostracism, found her influence paramount as the true exponent of constitutional government. The British minister could hardly appear on the streets because of the cheering crowds that followed him. The new government secured the services of a British admiral to reorganize the fleet, of a British financial agent from Egypt to reorganize the finances, and of a British engineer to take charge of public works. The glittering edifice of influence built up by ten years of adroit diplomacy on the part of Marschall von Bieberstein seemed to have fallen. It was necessary for all the states, great and small, to reconsider their respective attitudes towards the Porte. Who could tell what a regenerated Turkey might not be able to do? The great powers withdrew their civil and military officials from Macedonia. Bulgaria, Servia and Greece compelled their national bands in Macedonia to cease operations. It appeared as if Turkey were to be given a free hand to reorganize her affairs according to the provisions of the constitution. The subject nationalities were most hopeful.
religious freedom and the equality of all races were guaranteed. Rather, there were no longer to exist distinctions of race, because all men were to become loyal Ottomans, equal participants in the government. Christians and Mohammedans alike were to man the civil service and march side by side in the army. The law courts were to be reformed, so that the disabilities under which non-Moslems labored should be removed. Complete freedom of choice was to be given in the election of members to the Chamber of Deputies. Liberty, equality and fraternity were to be the watchwords of the new Turkey. The summer of 1908 was given up to felicitation and fraternization.

This beatific vision was of short duration. On September 19, the government gave a dinner to the representatives of the foreign powers at Constantinople. To this function M. Gueshoff, the Bulgarian agent, was not invited, on the ground that Bulgaria was a vassal state and that its agent did not rank as a diplomatist representing a foreign power. This was technically true. The Treaty of Berlin erected Bulgaria into a self-governing principality under the sovereignty of the sultan and with the proviso that it was to pay him an annual tribute. But no tribute had ever been paid, and under the old régime the representative of Bulgaria had, in later years, been treated as a diplomatic representative. To excite the national susceptibilities of the Bulgarians by the exclusion of M. Gueshoff was the first of a series of fatal errors made by the Young Turks in their foreign policy. The Bulgarian people, who took no little pride in the greater progress they had made as compared with the other Balkan peoples, would not submit to a national status inferior to that of Greece, Servia and Montenegro, even as a diplomatic fiction. On October 5 Bulgaria declared her independence, and shortly afterwards Prince Ferdinand was crowned tsar at Tirnovo, the ancient capital of the Bulgarian tsars. Nor was this all. A strike having broken out on the Rumelian section of the Oriental Railway, the Bulgarian government undertook to man it with troops. When the strike was over, the government announced that it had sequestrated the railway. When Bulgaria was formed as a principality in 1878, it assumed the control of the Turkish state railways in its territory,
together with the rights and obligations bound up with them. But when it annexed Eastern Rumelia, in 1885, it was afraid to interfere with the railway in that province. For the following twenty-three years it was exposed to the commercial disadvantage and strategic danger of having the principal railway owned by one foreign power, Turkey, and exploited by the capitalists of two other foreign powers, Germany and Austria. From this situation it now hastened to extricate itself. Moreover, the Bulgarian government denounced the Capitulation, which had never been abrogated in Eastern Rumelia. When the powers represented that these acts contravened the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria answered that she was not a party to that treaty.

Bulgaria's action, however, had opened a door through which a party to that treaty was to walk. Both Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary denied that they acted in collusion: but Bulgaria's course at least facilitated the execution of the Austrian designs. On October 7, the Austro-Hungarian government announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the dual monarchy. Article xxv of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 merely provided for the provisional occupation and administration of these provinces by Austria-Hungary. The sovereignty was to remain with the sultan. Moreover, the Convention of Constantinople, signed by the two powers April 21, 1879, clearly states that the occupation "in no way affects the rights of sovereignty of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." And although the Austrian occupation had conferred lasting material benefits upon the provinces, the people had not been won to acquiescence. They had demanded in 1878 to be united to Servia and had only submitted to the Austrian occupation in 1879 after a serious rebellion. Moreover they had not been granted political rights, even up to 1908. As a result of the Turkish Revolution they saw their fellow Slavs in the Ottoman empire endowed with political freedom and electoral rights. As loyal subjects of their "sovereign" the sultan, they prepared to send delegates to Constantinople to demand representation in the Chamber of Deputies. There was nothing for Austria-Hungary to do but
to act, and to act quickly. Article xxv of the Treaty of Berlin also gave her the right "to maintain garrisons" in the sanjak of Novi Bazar on equal terms with the sultan. This had been considered a necessity in 1878 by Count Andrassy, in order to prevent this district, which separates Servia from Montenegro, from being seized by either of those two powers with the object of making their territories contiguous. A regenerated Turkey could now take care of this matter; and, as a concession to Turkey, the Austro-Hungarian government announced its readiness to evacuate the sanjak.

Count Aerenthal's announcement of the annexation of the provinces caused a great commotion in the chancellies of Europe. M. Izvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, immediately protested, asserting in his note: "The problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina is European in character and therefore cannot be solved unless and until it has been freely considered by the powers that were parties to the Treaty of Berlin, and also unless the settlement decided upon has received the assent of all the powers." He suggested the holding of a European conference to consider all controverted questions concerning the Balkans. Great Britain was equally indignant, and Sir Edward Grey seconded the proposal of M. Izvolsky, drawing Count Aerenthal's attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary was a signatory of the Special Protocol of the Black Sea Conference of January 7, 1871, which affirms that it is "an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty or modify the stipulations thereof unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement." On December 19, Austria-Hungary gave her answer to the Russian note, which note also represented the position of England, France, Italy and Turkey. The Austrian answer was to the effect that the Congress of Berlin had put no limitation upon the Austro-Hungarian occupation as to duration or jurisdiction; that Austria-Hungary had sacrificed much blood in tranquiliizing the provinces and much treasure in improving them; and that the imperial-royal government could not agree to the summoning of a European conference, if the program should deal with the question of the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in any other sense than as a \textit{fait accompli}. At the same time Count Aerenthal answered the loud protest and claim for territorial compensation put forth by Servia with the statement that no power except the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin was qualified to raise its voice on the subject of the changes effected by the annexation. Germany announced that she would support her ally in any consequences arising from her act. It is beyond the limits of this article to describe the negotiations, representations and notes that occupied the attention of European chancellries during the next few months. No one expected Austria-Hungary to give up the provinces, but it was insisted that she should have acted in a legal manner by asking the consent of the powers with whom she had contracted in 1878. However, on March 22, 1909, the German ambassador to Russia announced that if Russia did not consent to the abrogation of article xxv of the Treaty of Berlin, Austro-Hungarian troops would invade Servia, which had called out its reserves and was preparing for immediate hostilities. Russia was compelled to submit, and the other powers followed suit. Russia's army was unprepared, England and France were unwilling to go to war, and Italy was bound by the Triple Alliance. The idea of holding a conference was abandoned.

The declarations of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary had been immediately succeeded by one from Crete. The Cretan Chamber was convoked October 12, and by a unanimous vote it declared the union of Crete with Greece. But the Greek premier, M. Theotokis, asked for the sanction of the powers. No power wished to alienate the friendship of the new Turkey, and on October 28 the powers notified the Cretan government that its action was disallowed and that a union between Crete and Greece required their consent.

These numerous complications placed the Young Turks in a most embarrassing position. They had come into power to maintain the Ottoman empire and could not assent to any declaration impairing its authority or its dignity. They were not in a position to declare war against Austria, but they were not weaponless. A boycott on Austro-Hungarian goods was de-
declared by Turkish merchants. This boycott at once became very popular, and the losses to Austro-Hungarian commerce were enormous. Turkey refused to yield unless she received compensation. Austria finally agreed to pay £2,200,000 to the Porte, not for the transfer of sovereign rights over the two annexed provinces, but as an equivalent for church property and other lands therein belonging to the Ottoman Porte. The Young Turks knew also that they could not fight Bulgaria, whose army was in admirable condition. Here also, however, they had other means of action. Eastern Rumelia, as legally a tributary province, had had its goods admitted free of duty into Turkey. As part of independent Bulgaria, the Turkish customs could be levied on its goods. Moreover, it was an easy thing to cause vexatious delays in the transport of Bulgarian exports to the Aegean. As a result of the Porte’s attitude, Bulgaria agreed to pay to Turkey (by means of a Russian loan) £3,280,000 indemnity on account of the Eastern Rumelian tribute and railways. As to Crete, the Young Turks felt confident that they could defeat Greece in a campaign, and they announced that Cretan annexation would be considered a casus belli. This hastened the action of the powers noted above. On April 6, 1909, the Ottoman Parliament assented to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the dual monarchy, and on April 19 it recognized the independence of Bulgaria. The first great crisis in foreign affairs was over.

The crisis, however, had left its mark. Many Turks found the outcome of these settlements unsatisfactory. Moreover, the agents of reaction had been preaching among the ignorant and fanatical Moslems, especially in Asia Minor, that the new government intended to Christianize them. The Kurds revolted in Armenia, the Arabs in the Yemen, and a massacre of Christians took place at Adana in Asia Minor. Finally a counter revolution broke out at Constantinople itself on April 13, 1909. But the Committee of Union and Progress acted with great courage and celerity. Mahmud Shefket Pasha, the commander of the second army corps at Salonika, was despatched to Constantinople with 25,000 men and the rebellion was quickly crushed. Abdul Hamid was deposed, the constitution suspended and martial law proclaimed. The government remained for the next three years in the control of the Committee.
The counter revolution and its repression marked a change in the policy of the Young Turks in foreign as well as in domestic affairs. Young Turkey had been saved by the army, and the demands of the army had now to be heeded. Mahmud Shefket Pasha became minister of war. He had been educated in Germany, and he gave von der Goltz Pasha carte blanche in army reorganization. The influence of the army leaders was henceforth favorable to friendly relations with the Triple Alliance. Nor were the Young Turk leaders themselves averse to this, for the events of every succeeding month alienated them more and more from the Triple Entente. It was generally believed that Russia and Great Britain were determined to divide Persia between them. The boundary between Persia and Turkey had never been clearly defined, and, in view of what was happening, the Porte sent troops to occupy the neighboring Persian territory. This drew forth remonstrances from Russia and Great Britain. Moreover, the sympathies not only of the peoples of Great Britain and France but of their governments were with Greece in the Cretan difficulty. Finally, the greatest difficulty of the Young Turks was lack of money, and they could neither borrow it in France or in Great Britain nor secure the consent of the French and British governments to measures which would enable them to raise it. Turkey cannot increase her customs duties without the consent of the powers represented in the Public Debt Administration. In 1910 Austria-Hungary and Germany gave their consent to an increase in the tariff from 11 per cent to 15 per cent and also to the taxation of foreigners engaged in business. In the Cretan affair neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany acted in concert with the other great powers. So skilfully did Marschall von Bieberstein play on these various strings of the diplomatic harp that before he retired, at the close of 1910, Austro-German influence at the Porte was once more paramount. That influence was used to bring about an entente between Rumania and Turkey in the autumn of 1910, both of those countries being at swords' points with Greece and both fearing any increase in Bulgaria's strength. The influence of this entente was neutralized, however, by the drawing together of Greece and Bulgaria. This was due, in
part, to increasing tension between each of these states and Turkey. In June, 1910, the Cretan assembly elected four representatives to the Greek Parliament; the Porte protested, and a Turkish boycott of Greek goods was declared. Bulgarian clubs in Turkey were closed by order of the Ottoman government because of their political activity, and this was resented at Sofia. Closer relations between Greece and Bulgaria were signalized and promoted by an arrangement between the Greek patriarch and the Bulgarian exarch, settling the controversies regarding the possession of the churches in Macedonia, which had always been the chief cause of contention between the two countries.

It was, however, the domestic policy of the Young Turks that proved their undoing. The counter revolution of April 13, 1909, strengthened their resolution to carry out to the bitter end the two principles upon which new Turkey was to rest, namely, the centralizing of governmental authority at Constantinople and the Turkification of all the non-Turkish elements in the empire. The execution of the former principle was sure to cause general discontent throughout the empire, even among the Moslems, for Turkish authority among Kurds, Arabs and Albanians had always been weak. This policy also destroyed the hope of autonomy aroused among the Macedonians by the Revolution of 1908. The execution of the second policy was still more fatal. Even among the Moslems it was certain to breed trouble, for the Arab has a great contempt for the Turk, and the Albanian's chief virtue is his love for his race. But to undertake to Turkify the subject Christians, burning with the hatred of five centuries of oppression and determined to be united sometime to their fellow Christians in the free states, and at the same time to seek to induce Moslems to treat as equals the disdained Christians whom they had always ruled, was to attempt the impossible. Turkey has always been organized as a religious community, ruling other religious communities which it recognizes as creeds but not as nationalities. To convert such a religious community into a true state would necessarily be a very slow process; to attempt to convert a number of such communities into a centralized state was a visionary policy.

Trouble broke out in Albania in the autumn of 1910.
Albania has been the Ulster of Turkey. Its inhabitants are descendants of the Thracians and Illyrians driven into the mountains by the Slavic invaders of the seventh and later centuries. These hardy, warlike mountaineers have always been the bulwark of the Porte against the Serb advance; for although Catholic in the north, Orthodox in the south and Mohammedan only in the middle of Albania, they have disliked the Slav more than the Turk, and they have been willing to acknowledge the sovereignty of the sultan upon the single condition that they be let alone. Under the old régime they were generally let alone. About the year 1900 there began an intellectual awakening in Albania, due to a considerable extent to the schools that had been founded in the more civilized parts of the country by Austria and Italy for the purpose of extending their influence among the natives. The movement, which partook of the nature of a racial renaissance, was not in any way a political movement. At a convention of the leaders of the various clans it was decided that their common language should be written in the Latin script. Already there had been trouble with the Turkish government because of the refusal of the Moslem Albanians to pay the increased taxes. An order issued by the government, that only the Catholics would be permitted to use the Latin script and that the Orthodox must use the Greek and the Moslems the Arabic, produced a rebellion among the Moslem Albanians. The government resolved to subdue Albania once and for all, and a large army was despatched from Monastir to suppress the rebellion and disarm the population. At the same time, it was decided to search for and confiscate all firearms found among the Macedonians, who were much aroused by the eviction of the Christian peasantry in many districts to make room for Moslem immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The entrance of the Turkish army into Albania immediately brought Turkey into conflict with Montenegro, whose Albanian subjects ran over the border to help their brethren. But for the restraining influence of Russia at Cettinje and of Austria-Hungary at Constantinople, the two countries would have gone to war with each other. At first the Turks were successful in Albania and carried everything ruthlessly
before them; but in the summer of 1911 the Moslem Albanians, who alone had at first rebelled, were joined by the Catholic Mirdites of the north. In September the government was forced to grant an amnesty, to permit the Albanians to carry their arms as of old and to use the Latin alphabet. These terms were accepted by the Moslems but refused by the Mirdites, who issued a proclamation of autonomy for Albania, and the insurrection continued to waste the resources of the government. In the meantime the disarming of the Macedonians had been conducted with great brutality, and refugees began to pour over the frontiers into Bulgaria and Servia, rousing the peoples of those countries to great excitement. The representations of Russia and Austria, though professedly friendly, showed the Young Turks that the days of European interference in Turkish affairs had not ended on July 24, 1908. They were about to have more forcible evidence of this.

At the Algeciras Conference and in the later dispute between France and Germany, Italian support had been given to France despite Italy's alliance with Germany. When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, although that action was very repugnant to Italy as endangering her influence in Albania, she made no protest but bided her time. On September 28, 1911, Italy startled most of the chancelleries of Europe with the notification that she had determined to occupy Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and she promptly sent an army across the Mediterranean to make her occupation a fait accompli. Whatever the press of Europe might say, no official voice in Europe was raised in protest. Diplomatically it was a matter between Italy and Turkey. Resentment was deep at Berlin and Vienna, where professions of disinterested friendship for Turkey were made; but beyond the assurance sought and secured by Count Aehenthal from Italy, that the status quo in the Balkans was not to be disturbed and that any war which might ensue was not to extend to European Turkey, no representation was made by any power. The Turkish government, naturally, was outraged and felt no inclination to submit. Even if it had been so inclined, submission was impossible: for the Young Turks to sign away the only purely Moslem province of the empire would have
been to sign their death warrant. Ottoman public opinion had already become estranged from the Committee of Union and Progress because of its mistakes and failures. Turkey could not fight, for it had no navy, and though suzerain of Egypt it could not send an army across Egypt to the aid of Tripoli. But the gallant soldier, Enver Bey, who had started the Revolution of 1908, was sent with some other leaders to the aid of the few Turkish soldiers and Arabs. Turkey was able at least to prolong the conflict in Tripoli and thus to impose heavy financial burdens upon Italy. It was able also to bring ruin to the large trade which Italians had with Smyrna and other cities of Asia Minor. And this policy told. It gradually became evident to Italy that the hope of a short and successful campaign was not to be realized. With the idea of bringing greater pressure upon the Porte, Rhodes and eleven other islands of the Aëgean were occupied in April and May, 1912. The Porte retaliated by expelling all Italians from the vilayet of Smyrna. The Italian government sent a gunboat squadron to threaten the Dardanelles. The Porte answered this by closing the Dardanelles to all vessels. This action was a severe blow to neutral commerce and brought forth a strong representation from Russia. Meanwhile the domestic condition of Turkey was becoming so serious that the government was compelled to enter into diplomatic conversations with Italy to end the war. These were begun at Ouchy, Switzerland, in July, but dragged along until October 12, when Italy served an ultimatum upon the Porte, giving it three days in which to agree to the Italian proposals, failing which Italy would carry the war into European Turkey. As the Balkan states were at the point of declaring war, the representatives of the Porte signed the Treaty of Lausanne October 15, 1912. By its terms the Porte renounced all sovereignty over Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the sultan retaining his religious authority over the native Mussulmans. The Aëgean islands occupied by Italy during the war were restored to Turkey, on condition that reforms should be introduced in favor of the Christian population; and diplomatic and commercial relations were resumed.

It was indeed time that the war with Italy were ended. The
internal condition of Turkey had gone from bad to worse. Most of the disinterested patriots among the Young Turks had withdrawn from the Committee of Union and Progress, and the Committee was now controlled by extremists and placeholders. In the April elections which followed the dissolution of the Chamber in January, 1912, the adherents of the Committee secured a majority, but its victory was the result of good organization and much intimidation. Its majority did not represent public opinion. Charges of corruption made in the newspapers resulted in their suppression. The treasury was empty, because of the loss of revenue due to the stoppage of trade during the war. Officials had to go unpaid, as in Hamidian days. The army was discontented, and in June a rebellion broke out in the garrison at Monastir, bringing more discredit upon the Committee. The insurrection in Albania made great headway in May and June. The condition of Macedonia was so bad that in May the old Macedonian Committee, the Bulgarian organization which had suspended its activities since the Revolution of 1908, reorganized and demanded autonomy for Macedonia. The Committee of Union and Progress could no longer withstand the pressure of public opposition, and in July it gave way to the representatives of the party of "Liberal Accord." Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, as grand vizier, formed a ministry containing many of the best men in public life.

The new ministry met with great trials at the very outset of its career. Early in August an atrocious massacre of Bulgarians took place at Kochana. This deprived the government of the credit which it justly deserved for the sincere attempt it had made to punish the instigators of the massacre at Ishtib, which occurred in December, 1911. The ministry, however, had an unfriendly Chamber to deal with; and the dissolution of the Chamber resulted in the return of a majority of the Committee of Union and Progress, more extremist than ever in spirit. But the chief problem of the ministry was to meet the dangers that were gathering from without. In August there was a frontier battle between Montenegrins and Turks, and there were border conflicts between Bulgarian and Turkish soldiers. In the same month it became known that the apparently impos-
possible had happened: that an alliance existed between Servia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro. Conferences held by special agents of Bulgaria at Bucharest and to St. Petersburg and visits of King Ferdinand to Vienna and to Berlin were looked upon as attempts to secure assurances of non-intervention from the neighboring powers in case of war with Turkey. In September the great powers presented a collective note to the Porte, drawing attention to the miserable state of Macedonia and requesting the introduction of reforms. The Porte answered, early in October, that it would revive the Vilayets Law of 1880. It also promised the "scrupulous application" of this law, but it ignored the question of a guaranty for its execution. This was the crux of the matter. The "explanatory note" of the Bulgarian government to the Ottoman Porte concluded with the demand that the ministers of the Balkan states be associated with the ambassadors of the great powers in carrying out the reforms demanded. This was bitterly opposed by the Turkish press, and a ministerial crisis resulted in the return to power of the aged patriot, Kiamil Pasha, who had been the first grand vizier after the Revolution of 1908 and who, though not a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, was the one man in whom all parties had confidence. In the mean time it was asserted by the Bulgarian government that the Turkish army manoeuvres held near Adrianople in late September were directed against Bulgaria, and "to preserve its national safety" Bulgaria ordered, October 1, the mobilization of its troops. This action was imitated by the other Balkan states, and on October 8 half a million men threatened Turkey from the north and over a hundred thousand Greeks were massed along the southern frontier. The Porte retaliated by confiscating all war material intended for the allies and by seizing over a hundred Greek merchant vessels.

The great powers had not been inactive during these events. As early as mid-September Germany and Austria-Hungary had agreed to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, and Austria-Hungary mobilized an army along the Danube with the avowed intention of protecting her interests in the sanjak of Novi Bazar. This action produced much irritation in Russia and resulted in
military activity along the Galician frontier. France led European diplomacy in exerting itself to maintain peace among the great powers and localize the war. M. Poincaré, the French foreign minister, proposed on October 1 that the representatives of the great powers at the capitals of all the Balkan states, including Constantinople, present to the several governments a collective note containing three propositions: (1) the powers would condemn any belligerent action; (2) in the event of war they would permit no modification of the territorial status quo; (3) they would secure under article xxiii of the Treaty of Berlin reforms for the Christian inhabitants of European Turkey which would not be inconsistent with the sovereignty of the sultan or the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire. Sir Edward Grey hesitated as to the method of procedure, and the note was not presented to the Balkan states until October 8. One hour after its receipt at Cettinje, Montenegro declared war against Turkey. The Austro-German press at once accused Russia, whose influence in Montenegro has always been paramount, of duplicity, and the danger of international complications became pronounced. The other Balkan states declined to consider the reforms promised by the powers because of their vagueness, and they presented an ultimatum to the Porte which demanded, among other things, national autonomy for Macedonia, Christian governors for the Christian vilayets, the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the substitution of local militia. The Porte replied by declaring war against Bulgaria and Servia, October 17, 1912, and immediately upon receipt of the information Greece declared war against Turkey.

Of decisive importance, as the event showed, was the relative degree of preparedness of the opposing forces in the war. The present commander of the Bulgarian army is its real creator. In 1903 General Savoff was made minister of war and undertook the reorganization of the military forces. In the ten years that have intervened he has developed what is probably the finest fighting engine of its size in Europe. His success would have been impossible, however, without the support of the Bulgarian people. Nowhere in history has there been a more remarkable instance of an entire nation—not the government alone, but the
whole people—yielding itself to the realization of a single aim. For since 1903 Bulgaria has devoted its entire strength to one purpose, to make itself ready for this one inevitable war. In Greece also there has been a remarkable recuperation. As a result of the Cretan fiasco of 1908, the army rebelled in 1909, and for a time the state appeared upon the brink of dissolution. The crisis, however, brought forth the needed man. M. Venezelos, one of the really great men of Europe to-day, was made prime minister and undertook the rehabilitation of the state. His first task was the reorganization of the army. He borrowed a general and several staff officers from the French army, and, as the result of excellent financial administration, he was able to provide the necessary artillery and equipment. His second great task was to bring about a union of the Balkan states; and here again he was successful, owing largely to the receptive attitude of that other skillful Balkan diplomatist, Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Moreover he found Servia prepared. After her display of anger in 1908, following the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Servia settled down to a period of recuperation and, under the leadership of M. Pashich, consolidated her resources to procure the money necessary to refit the army. Montenegro was always ready to undertake the kind of warfare necessary in that bleak mountainous region and was fairly well supplied with war material, though of older pattern, given in the past few years by Russia and Italy. In each of these countries the people were one with the government in realizing the necessity for sacrifices to attain their object.

Against the four well equipped and well led armies, numbering seven hundred thousand men, which the allies were able to put into the field, the Porte had, distributed throughout Turkey in Europe, about half as many men. The Turkish army was ill-organized, badly officered, poorly equipped and scarcely fed at all. Abdul Hamid had been afraid to hold field manoeuvres and firing practice on a proper scale, and the reforms of von der Goltz Pasha were worked out on paper rather than in the field. The Young Turks had removed most of the old officers and replaced them chiefly with inexperienced young men who dab-
bled in politics and who did not have the confidence of the troops. At the outbreak of the war the Italian fleet, and during the war the Greek fleet, prevented the carrying of troops by sea from Asia Minor to Constantinople, and the land transport was beneath contempt. The commissariat was worthless and the troops went into battle half-starved. Within three weeks of the declaration of war, Turkey in Europe was almost swept bare of Turkish troops, save in the three fortresses of Adrianople, Janina and Scutari, and the Bulgarian army was in front of the Chataldja fortifications which protect Constantinople.

Europe was astounded. In Austria and Germany a Turkish victory had been confidently expected, and the most fervent supporters of the Balkan states had not anticipated such rapid success. M. Poincaré suggested the holding of a European conference, in which the Balkan states should be represented and at which the political changes in the territories occupied by the allies should be recognized and the sultan's sovereignty over a strip of territory around Constantinople guaranteed. This was rejected as being too radical, and the war continued. Before December 1 the Servian army (contrary to the express prohibition of Austria) had occupied Durazzo on the Adriatic Sea; the Greeks had taken Salonika; but the Bulgarian attack on the Chataldja line had been repulsed. On December 3, Turkey on the one side and Bulgaria, Servia and Montenegro on the other signed an armistice; Greece, however, refused to do so, hoping to bring about the fall of Janina and to secure possession of the islands of the Ægean by means of its fleet. A Peace Conference, in which all the states at war were represented, met at London, December 13. Upon the invitation of Sir Edward Grey, a conference of the ambassadors of the great powers at London was also opened, to keep in touch with the progress of the negotiations.

At the Peace Conference, largely through the influence of M. Venezelos, the allies agreed to act as a unit in their negotiations with Turkey, to present their demands in their entirety and to leave the division of the conquered territory among themselves for subsequent consideration. Their peace proposal was a very simple one: the Porte should cede to the allies all European
Turkey west of a boundary line running from Midia on the Black Sea along the river Erghene to the river Maritza and thence to the gulf of Enos on the Ægean, and all the Ægean islands. On December 28, the Turks presented their counter proposals: the whole vilayet of Adrianople was to remain under the sovereignty of the sultan; Macedonia was to become an autonomous principality under Turkish suzerainty; Albania was to become an autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty; and the status of Crete was to be determined solely by Turkey and the protecting powers which had maintained the international control. These terms, which had probably been presented only as a basis for future bargaining, were at once rejected by the allies. On January 1, 1913, the Turkish delegates presented their "irreducible minimum": the vilayet of Adrianople was to remain under the sovereignty of the sultan, but Turkey and Bulgaria were to negotiate any rectification of frontier recognized by them as necessary; all occupied territories west of the vilayet of Adrianople were to be ceded to the allies, but the determination of the boundaries and status of autonomous Albania was to be submitted to the decision of the great powers; Turkey was to retain possession of the Ægean islands, but to discuss with the great powers questions relating to them; and Turkey would accept any decision that should be reached by the protecting powers with regard to Crete. These terms also were at once rejected by the allies, because they suggested separate agreements and because the cession of territory seemed to them wholly inadequate.

The conflicting proposals of the allies and of Turkey brought out prominently the chief problems of the conference: (1) the status of Adrianople, the possession of which both Bulgaria and Turkey consider essential to their national safety; (2) the status of the Ægean islands, which are inhabited by Greeks who demand to be united to the mother country, but of which some (e. g. Imbros, Tenedos and Lemnos) are asserted to be necessary to Turkey for the protection of the Dardanelles, since they command the entrance to the straits, while others (e. g. Mitylene) are part of Asiatic Turkey; (3) Albania, whose boundaries have always been in doubt and through the
middle of which Servia demands a strip of territory leading to Durazzo. In addition to these difficult problems there are others to be met, such as the proportion of the Ottoman debt to be assumed by each of the allies and the status of the railways which, though nominally the property of the Ottoman state, are really owned by foreign companies, chiefly Austro-German. Truly, the allies showed great wisdom in deferring the greatest of all the problems, the division of the spoils, to subsequent consideration.

During the whole month of January, 1913, the peace negotiations dragged on without result, chiefly because of the dilatory tactics of the Turkish delegates, who were evidently sparring for time. The repulse of the Bulgarian attack on the Chataldja lines and the failure of the allies to take Adrianople, Janina or Scutari had greatly stiffened the war spirit at Constantinople, and the military leaders were strongly in favor of resuming hostilities. This was contrary to the views of the grand vizier, Kiamil Pasha, and most of the ministers, but no one wished to appear in the unpopular role of peace advocate. On the other hand, the maintenance of the large armies at the front was an enormous drain upon the resources of the Balkan states. Moreover, Rumania was demanding of the Bulgarian government guarantees for compensation in return for her neutrality during the war. The extent of her demands was not made known. She has always been desirous to rectify her southern frontier, and such a rectification would probably deprive Bulgaria of the triangle from Silistria to Varna, including the former strategic city and the latter valuable port. These considerations impelled the delegates of the allies to announce, on January 14, that if Turkey did not speedily come to terms the allies would resume hostilities.

In the mean time the conference of the ambassadors of the great powers had not been idle. When that conference assembled, Austria-Hungary had made plain her position with reference to the Servian demand for a port on the Adriatic with a hinterland. In the slogan of the allies, "the Balkan peninsula for the Balkan peoples," Austria found a principle which could be utilized against their demands. The Albanians are a Balkan
people entirely distinct from Slavs and Greeks and particularly unfriendly to the Slavs. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 had given a part of their country to Montenegro, and that mistake had afterwards to be rectified after much bloodshed. It would be as suicidal now to place any of the Albanians under the Slavs as to put back any of the Slavs under the Turks. Albania must be made an autonomous state, and that it may live in peace it must possess its seaboard intact. In this position Austria was seconded by Italy, which has interests in Albania as important as those of Austria-Hungary. Neither state can afford to allow the other to possess the eastern shore of the Adriatic, and both are resolved that it shall not fall into the possession of another possibly strong power. On December 20 it was announced that the ambassadors had recommended to their governments, and the latter had accepted, the principle of Albanian autonomy, together with a provision guaranteeing to Servia commercial access to the Adriatic. The mode of access remains to be determined. Probably Servia will receive the use of a harbor and a guaranty of the duty-free conveyance of her exports and imports over the railway leading to it.

The threatened failure of the negotiations between the allies and the Turks caused great concern in the conference of ambassadors. The latter finally agreed to recommend to the various governments represented that their ambassadors at Constantinople should present a collective note to the Porte urging it to come to terms with the allies. After considerable delay, because of hesitancy upon the part of Germany, the collective note was presented to the Porte January 17, 1913. The note advised the Porte to bring the war to an end and "to consent to the cession of the town of Adrianople to the Balkan states, and to leave to the powers the task of deciding upon the fate of the islands in the Ægean Sea." If the Porte yields consent to these propositions, "the powers will arrange a settlement of the question of the islands of the Archipelago which will exclude all menace to the security of Turkey." Three days later the Porte answered that so momentous a decision would have to be made by the Grand Council of the Ottoman Empire. On January 22 the Grand Council voted almost unanimously to
accept the advice of the great powers. This decision caused great commotion in Constantinople. It was unpopular in the army and was especially resented by the Young Turk officers. The Committee of Union and Progress determined to prevent its execution. On the morning of January 23, Enver Bey, accompanied by other officers and by a mob, appeared at the Porte and demanded the resignation of the ministry. Kiamil Pasha and his colleagues at once resigned, and representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress took their place, with Mahmud Shefket Pasha as grand vizier. The peace delegates of the allies in London agreed to wait a week for the reply of the new ministry to the collective note of the powers. As none was forthcoming, on January 29 they notified the Turkish delegates that the war would be resumed at the end of four days, the term after notice provided in the armistice. On February 1 the Turkish reply to the note of the powers was published. Its two chief points were that the question of the Aegean islands should be left wholly to the powers, and that the city of Adrianople should be divided, the territory on the left bank of the Maritza river, which contains the great mosques and most of the Mussulman population, remaining Turkish. On February 3 the representatives of Great Britain and of Germany at Sofia presented separate notes to the Bulgarian government. The British note counseled prudence and moderation. The German note was much sharper: it stated that in the opinion of the German government the reply of the Porte was adequate and that the Bulgarian government was not justified in maintaining an obstinate attitude. The Bulgarian government answered at once to the effect that the Porte was fully aware that the allies would agree to the retention by Turkey of the mosques in Adrianople and the maintenance there of a representative of the caliph with extraterritorial privileges, and that the answer of the Porte to the collective note was but a subterfuge to prolong the discussion, which had already lasted two months without result. On the same evening, February 3, hostilities were resumed at Adrianople.

Whatever may be the nature of the treaty of peace, there can be no doubt that the Balkan war will have a profound influence
upon European diplomacy. The division of Macedonia will sorely try the union of the allies. If they divide it amicably, the question remains whether they will modify their traditional ambitions to make them conform to accomplished facts. If they can do this, the Confederation of the Balkans may not only be permanent but may take its place as a seventh great power in European diplomacy. Whether Turkey can pull itself together, consolidate its resources and develop the immense possibilities of its Asiatic possessions remains, of course, to be seen. Whether it is not better for Turkey to make the enemy of yesterday the ally of to-morrow and become a member of the Balkan Confederation, should the Confederation survive, is another question. Turkey must needs have friends, and in international relations there is no unselfish friendship: recent events have shown that the friendship of any of the great powers is determined and controlled solely by the interests of that power. A similar problem will confront Rumania.

It can hardly be doubted that the Turkish debacle is a blow for the Triple Alliance. In the event of a general European war much hope had been placed by German and Austro-Hungarian publicists upon the friendship and even support of Turkey. And the Balkan peoples are fully aware of the mean view of them hitherto held at Vienna and Berlin. Nevertheless their statesmen have shown such marked ability and restraint during the recent crisis that there is good ground for believing that the Balkan states will refuse to be made the catspaw of Russia or of any group of powers. But prophecy in the field of politics is proverbially hazardous, and to forecast the future of the Balkan states is a futile undertaking.

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